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Abstract
The commercial seed sector has been slow to develop in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper
examines the major impediments and identifies areas in which seed policies can be strength-
ened. Seed enterprise development has been hampered by regulatory frameworks that favor
parastatal enterprises and that inhibit commercial innovation. In addition, government and
donor projects provide large amounts of free or subsidized seed that further discourages seed
enterprise development. In addition to regulatory reform and the curtailment of many seed
distribution projects, there are other policy changes that need to be implemented. National
agricultural research institutes need to invest more resources in promoting their varieties and
helping to stimulate commercial seed production. Greater emphasis is required on regional
strategies for public plant breeding and private seed marketing. National policies need to
strengthen input marketing capacity and infrastructure. Finally, donors, governments and
NGOs should shift from trying to encourage village-level commercial seed production and
instead strengthen farmers’ capacities to assess new varieties and to be effective consumers
of commercial inputs. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Although commercial seed provision is expanding in most of the world, the story
for Africa is very different. With the exception of a few countries (e.g., South Africa),
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and a few crops (e.g., hybrid maize), there is very little evidence of successful com-
mercial seed sector development. This paper examines some of the major reasons
for this failure. It also outlines a set of policy changes required to improve the
complementarity of public and private sector investments in developing national and
regional seed supply systems. Many of the conclusions are based on a recently com-
pleted study of seed policies and performance in four countries: Kenya, Malawi,
Zambia and Zimbabwe (Tripp, 2000).
The paper argues that the failure of formal seed provision in Africa can be largely
attributed to the narrow focus of seed policy regimes. National seed policies emphas-
ize public systems of variety development, multiplication and distribution. Many
donor investments target the establishment of community seed projects, subsidize
seed delivery or distribute free seed under relief programs. Meanwhile, commercial
channels for retail seed trade remain grossly underdeveloped and private seed compa-
nies devote their efforts to speculating on the level and timing of the next relief pro-
gram.
Policy makers are currently under pressure to deregulate and liberalize markets
in order to stimulate seed trade. Yet large gaps persist in understanding how public
policy can facilitate the development of more sustainable seed supply systems.
Deregulation alone will contribute little to the development of seed markets. Insti-
tutional development requires a longer term view of development objectives. Parti-
cular attention must be directed to the complementarities of public and private invest-
ments, and towards the linkages between various levels of seed production — from
breeding to commercial seed delivery.
This paper examines these issues in the context of a review of recent investments
in seed projects by a range of donors in Africa. The first three sections describe the
principal impediments to seed system development: seed regulatory regimes, national
seed production agencies and seed distribution programs. The following three sec-
tions examine opportunities for the pursuit of more complementary investments by:
national agricultural research institutes, commercial seed companies, and community
seed projects. The final section draws conclusions and outlines the requirements for
seed policy reform in Africa.
Regulation
Most African countries share a common seed provision strategy. Public agencies
are responsible for developing, multiplying and distributing seed of new varieties.
Strict controls on variety release, multiplication and trade are viewed necessary to
protect the farmer. As a result, virtually all plant breeding is in the hands of publicly
funded national agricultural research institutes (NARIs). A single agency is given
responsibility for formal seed production under the regulatory control of a national
seed laboratory or quality control unit.
Seed regulations have developed to support this system, and, it may be argued,
to protect these monopolies from outside competition. Thus only seed of varieties
that have been approved by the official variety release committee can be sold. These
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committees have historically been controlled by public sector officials and scientists
who look with suspicion on foreign varieties. Selection criteria have emphasized
grain yields documented in government-run trials. In most cases, seed certification
has been mandatory. Quality control standards are enforced by a national seed labora-
tory and certification agency with only a single client, the national seed company.
During the past ten years liberalization policies, the failure of many parastatal
seed companies, and the weakening support for NARIs have caused this general
model of seed regulation to be questioned throughout the continent. These concerns
have been reinforced by the recognition that variety adoption continues to lag for
most crops other than maize. Yet uncertainty remains about how much regulation
is necessary to protect the small-scale farmer. In consequence, the extent of actual
reforms has generally been superficial.
With respect to variety release, some countries (such as Zambia) have established
fairly transparent procedures for testing and approving foreign varieties. But progress
is slow; it has taken many years for Kenya to begin to allow the sale of foreign
maize hybrids. In the majority of cases the variety release procedures still work in
favor of those varieties developed by the NARI. Varieties released by NARIs in
neighboring countries, or those developed by private companies, face an uphill battle
for approval. The results of privately run trials or trials in neighboring countries with
similar agro-ecologies are not considered. Also, the relative importance of traits other
than yield, such as improvements in processing quality valued by industry, still
receive little or no consideration.
Similarly, reforms of seed quality and certification regulations have generally
resulted in only cosmetic change. Recent modifications in Zimbabwe and Malawi
have allowed seed of certain crops to be sold without certification. This is largely
because public certification agencies acknowledged they did not have the funding
or staff to assure certification regulations were consistently implemented. However
these countries still require that all seed must be tested for germination and purity
by an official laboratory. A few larger companies have been permitted to maintain
licensed laboratories, but seed from other producers must still pass through a govern-
ment testing facility before it can be marketed.
Although there is considerable discussion about the harmonization of seed laws
(e.g., Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994), only in the past year have there been
renewed discussions about possible harmonization strategies in eastern and southern
Africa. Harmonization is viewed by seed companies as a means to facilitate regional
trade of seed. Some regulators in government seed units, however, view harmoniz-
ation as a means to reinforce strict rules relating to phytosanitary standards and seed
purity. In effect, harmonization could lead either to a reduction of non-tariff barriers
to trade, or to the common enforcement of stricter national rules. One key decision
relates to the possibility of a regional agreement on variety release or registration.
Most countries remain reluctant to give up strict controls on variety release, yet the
demand for most nationally registered varieties remains insufficient to encourage
commercial investments in seed multiplication and distribution. A recent analysis
has demonstrated the potential for grain trade within Eastern and Southern Africa
(Weeks and Subasat, 1998). A similar potential exists for regional seed trade (Rusike
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and Rohrbach, 1998). Yet there have been only preliminary discussions of requisite
moves towards regional registration of varieties, or the possible elimination of regis-
tration requirements.
Similar uncertainty underlies requirements for seed trade within most countries.
Though competition is now being allowed with government seed enterprises, and
some of these public companies are being privatised, wholesale and retail traders in
most countries must still obtain special licenses to sell seed. Regulations ostensibly
meant to restrict sales of inappropriate seed severely limit the extent of participation
in seed trade. Regulators rarely have the capacity to carry out point-of-sale inspection
and farmers, whom the licensing restrictions are meant to help, remain with no access
to improved varieties.
Public seed production agencies
Another impediment to sustainable seed provision in Africa is the continuing exist-
ence of inefficient public seed production agencies. A number of parastatal seed
companies are still in operation, although some of these have been closed (e.g.,
Ghana) or sold off (e.g., Malawi). Until recently, many of these parastatals have
enjoyed a monopoly status, discouraging the formation of domestic private seed
companies and blocking the entry of foreign firms. This situation is now changing,
but private seed companies still operate at a considerable disadvantage.
Some countries maintain national seed multiplication units rather than parastatal
seed enterprises. The range of seed crops multiplied by such units is limited and the
costs of multiplication and distribution are high. We have no examples of full cost
recovery for any of these operations. In Botswana, for example, virtually all of the
seed ‘sold’ by the national Seed Multiplication Unit is delivered to national drought
relief programs. Further, the cost of seed produced by contract farmers is higher
than the price of the limited quantities of seed sold through commercial channels
(Rohrbach and Makhwaje, 1999). Recent studies in West Africa (Ndjeunga, 1997)
reveal that most public seed multiplication units and laboratories are largely defunct,
despite donor investments of more than US$100 million in their development.
Trained staff move on to more remunerative positions, laboratories are not main-
tained, seed production estimates are grossly inaccurate, seed production costs are
higher than sales revenues, and farmers remain largely unaware of most new var-
ieties.
Seed distribution programs
One of the most serious constraints to seed system development is the strategy of
free seed distribution, either through relief operations, or in the context of agricultural
development programs. During the past decade, serious droughts, wars and civil
conflict have been the motive for a number of emergency seed distribution efforts.
Governments and NGOs search for whatever seed inventories they can find on
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regional and global markets to meet this demand. The sudden need for large quan-
tities of seed, often declared just weeks before the next planting season, almost inevi-
tably leads to the purchase of poor quality seed of inappropriate or unidentified
varieties (ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme, 1996). Regulations restricting
sales of unreleased varieties, or seed of unknown quality, are simply ignored in
these cases.
In many countries, free seed deliveries have continued even after the end of relief
programs. The political value attached to handing out free agricultural inputs has
encouraged a proliferation of government, donor and NGO programs delivering seed
as part of more general poverty alleviation strategies. Recent experience in Malawi
provides a good example (Table 1). A severe drought during the 1991/92 season led
to a large-scale distribution of maize ‘seed’ (actually locally purchased grain) in
1992/93. This was followed by the distribution of hybrid seed and fertilizer in sub-
sequent seasons. Continuing concern about food shortages and the low adoption of
hybrid seed and fertilizer led to a joint donor-government ‘Starter Pack Scheme’ in
1998/99. This program distributed 2.6 million packs of free (mostly hybrid) maize
seed, a legume ‘seed’ (mostly obtained in grain markets), and fertilizer (enough to
plant 0.1 ha for every farm household in Malawi). The scheme was repeated in
1999/2000. The scheme is defended both as a means to help rural Malawians make
up for production shortages and as an extension tool to introduce farmers to mod-
ern inputs.
A similar story can be told for Zimbabwe (Table 2). After a drought-induced seed
distribution program in 1992/93, the government continued distributing seed of vari-
ous crops and fertilizer as a poverty alleviation measure for an additional five years.
Following the 1991/92 drought, the government and various relief agencies distrib-
Table 1
Seed distribution in Malawi: some major examplesa
Program Activities
Drought Relief Seeds Distribution Project, In response to drought of 1991/92, 1.3 million
1992/93 farmers each received 10 kg of maize ‘seed’,
purchased on local grain market
Drought Recovery Inputs Programme, 1994/95 In response to uneven rains the previous year, and
collapse of the agricultural credit system, 4139 t
of hybrid maize seed was distributed to farmers
Supplementary Inputs Programme, 1995/96 3451 t of hybrid maize seed and 21 t of sorghum
seed distributed. Fertiliser distributed in higher-
potential areas
Starter Pack Scheme, 1998/99 Hybrid maize seed, fertiliser and legume seed
sufficient for planting 0.1 ha distributed to every
farm household in Malawi (2.6 m packs). Total
seed distribution 5200 t hybrid maize, 500 t OPV
maize, 4000 t groundnut, 1600 t soybean
Starter Pack Scheme, 1999/2000 Starter Pack Scheme repeated for second year.
a Source: Longley et al. (1999).
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Table 2
Zimbabwe: government investment in seed distribution programs, 1992/93 to 1998/99 (Z$million)a
Cropping season Expenditure on seed distributionb
1992/93 71.4
1993/94 29.9
1994/95 43.5
1995/96 87.2
1996/97 65.0
1997/98 24.5c
1998/99 17.1c
a Sources: Mukora (1997); National Early Warning Unit (1999).
b Cost of seed only (maize, sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut and sunflower); does not include distri-
bution costs.
c Costs of vouchers distributed to farmers to subsidize purchases of seed and fertilizer.
uted enough sorghum and pearl millet seed to cover 20–30 percent of the national
acreage planted to these crops (Friis-Hansen and Rohrbach, 1993). In the 1993/94
cropping season enough sorghum seed was distributed to plant 150% of Zimbabwe’s
sorghum area (and enough pearl millet seed for 80% of the crop’s area) (Rohrbach
et al., 1997). The government curtailed the input distribution program after 1997/98,
but replaced this with a new program to distribute vouchers that could be exchanged
for seed.
Such seed distribution programs have a predictable impact on the seed industry.
Although the programs have increased industry interest in crops such as sorghum,
pearl millet and grain legumes, companies remain reluctant to invest in producing
quality seed of released varieties of these crops due to uncertainty about the consist-
ency of seed demand. This concern is reinforced by the fact that some tenders are
awarded for cheaper generic seed (or grain cleaned to seed standards) rather than
higher quality seed stocks of specific new varieties. Correspondingly, farmers com-
plain that they already have the varieties being distributed through relief programs.
In some cases, grain that farmers have sold has been returned to them as seed
(Rohrbach and Mutiro, 1997).
Seed distribution programs have also discouraged the development of wholesale
and retail seed trade channels (Tripp, 2000). Companies are pleased to sell large
consignments of seed to a single buyer. Any interest in developing local seed distri-
bution channels is reduced by the possibility that government or an NGO will sud-
denly initiate a free seed distribution program.
The disincentives and uncertainty caused by seed distribution programs, the inef-
ficiencies and privileges of public seed producers, and the existence of restrictive
regulatory regimes all conspire to inhibit the development of a commercial seed
sector in Africa. Policy change is required to address each of these problems. In
addition, attention must be given to three other areas: the interface between public
plant breeding and the commercial seed sector, strategies that encourage the emerg-
ence of commercial seed capacity, and the orientation of local-level seed projects.
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National agricultural research institutes
The absence of effective formal seed systems in Africa greatly reduces the impact
of publicly funded plant breeding programs. Failures of seed multiplication and dis-
semination translate into negative rates of return to research investments. NARIs
have been let down by ineffective and under-funded extension services (who are
supposed to promote these varieties) and by inefficient parastatal seed companies
that never managed to deliver seed for many crops that are important to African
farming systems. While NARIs cannot be blamed for these failures, they have no
other choice than to accept major responsibility for addressing the problems. One
consequence is that NARIs must accept more of a stewardship role for their research
results. This may require reallocating funds away from the development of additional
varieties towards the monitoring of breeder, foundation and commercial seed pro-
duction of varieties already released. Part of this funding may also need to be allo-
cated to programs specifically designed to increase public awareness about new var-
ieties. These additional responsibilities are admittedly difficult in an era of restricted
funding for NARIs, but unless they are able to play a stronger role in delivering
their products, the funding scenario will only grow darker.
Currently, most African farmers know little about the range of plant varieties being
developed and released by national crop improvement programs. It is not unusual
to find that the farmers growing a new variety do not even know its name (Tripp,
2000). Varieties distributed in relief programs are locally named for their character-
istics or for the extension worker responsible for introducing this seed to a com-
munity. Recent ICRISAT surveys in Zimbabwe, for example, indicate that new sor-
ghum and pearl millet varieties introduced in 1992 commonly have 4 to 8 different
names depending on the circumstances of initial delivery.
While ignorance of the official name of a variety is not a major problem per se,
given the convoluted letter and number codes often assigned to varieties (and the
problems of choosing which local language to use), greater knowledge of variety
options can facilitate decisions about adoption. Farmers may justifiably ask whether
the new variety of pearl millet being introduced this year is the same cultivar they
already have, or the same poor variety they received during a previous drought relief
program, or something truly new. The success of those varieties that have spread
from farmer to farmer is often based on an immediately obvious characteristic, such
as early maturity. If NARIs hope to offer a range of varieties of one crop, or to
improve upon available varieties with new cultivars offering more cryptic qualities,
such as disease resistance, then more must be invested in ensuring that farmers can
appreciate what is on offer.
Similarly, variety promotion needs to become more imaginative. In an age of
falling communication costs (and increasing literacy), the provision of simple, attract-
ive printed material that describes new varieties should be pursued. Farmers also
need more information about where to find seed of new varieties — assuming this
is available on the market. In recent surveys in Zimbabwe, most farmers had no idea
where to find seed of new varieties for most crops other than hybrid maize
(Rohrbach, 1997). Once seed became available in local retail shops, demand sharply
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increased (Rohrbach and Malusalila, 1999).
One strategy that has proven useful for disseminating information about varieties,
and demonstrating commercial viability of seed demand, is the production and sale
of small packs of seed of new cultivars. The strategy was pioneered by CIAT
(International Center for Tropical Agriculture) and the national bean research pro-
grams in several African countries. In Malawi, the Bean Improvement Program (BIP)
has managed the production and sale of small packs (0.5 kg or less) of seed of six
new bean varieties. The packs have been sold by rural merchants and grocery shops
(as well as NGOs and extension offices). Over a period of three years, more than
15 tons of seed were sold in this way, and both merchants and farmers are enthusi-
astic about the experience (Phiri et al., 1999). Such public investments in demonstrat-
ing the demand for new varieties should help stimulate commercial investments in
multiplying and distributing this seed.
Another problem is the failure of NARIs to maintain basic stocks of breeder and
foundation seed. Seed provision depends on a well-organized source seed system in
which the original seed is multiplied through a series of stages to obtain sufficient
commercial seed. The nomenclature varies among countries, but for our discussion
breeder seed is the pure line maintained by the breeder, and foundation seed is the
penultimate stage planted to obtain commercial seed. Breeder seed maintenance is
often not separately funded in the budgets of NARIs. Breeders must decide how
much to invest in seed production versus further breeding activities. As incentive
systems reward additional releases, rather than seed availability and adoption, multi-
plication efforts emphasize the maintenance of small quantities of seed for the breed-
ers’ own use. Yet even this task is problematic given limited national investments
in maintaining research stations, irrigation facilities and cold stores. International
Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) commonly receive annual requests from
poorly endowed NARIs for the same germplasm.
In many African countries, foundation seed production has historically been the
duty of a national seed company with exclusive rights to public varieties. But if a
competitive commercial seed system is to be established, there must be open access
to foundation seed of new varieties. In order to promote this transition, NARIs must
give higher priority to breeder seed production. In addition, they must invest
resources in the production and distribution of foundation seed. This task may be
performed either by the research institute itself, or by individuals or companies con-
tracted to pursue the job.
Increased attention to source seed production should not be confused with income
generation. Many NARIs, encouraged by donors promoting the ‘privatization’ of
public research, have come to believe that they can earn a significant income from
royalties on public varieties. However, this premise is largely unwarranted for
African NARIs. In the first place, the amount of money to be earned from potential
royalties on most crop varieties is very modest. Secondly, given the underdeveloped
state of the commercial seed industry in Africa, this proposition puts the cart before
the horse. Perhaps most important, concentration on commercially attractive research
negates the justification for funding NARIs in the first place. “If the sale of research
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products is feasible and profitable, why should the public sector be involved in the
research in the first place?” (Byerlee and Alex, 1998 p. 37).
Finally, NARIs need to spend more time, and even a share of their budget, working
with seed companies to encourage multiplication and sale of their latest varieties. In
most African countries, public breeders still view themselves in competition with
private breeders. Yet this is a competition they are unlikely to win. Instead, NARIs
should openly acknowledge the evolutionary nature of this relationship (Pray and
Ramaswami, 1991). Companies may start by multiplying varieties developed by the
public sector. But over time, these companies can be expected to develop their own
variety selection and breeding programs. NARI breeders may then aim to fill gaps
in germplasm supply or variety targeting — for example the continuing supply of
open pollinated varieties. Regardless of the stage of development, greater collabor-
ation between NARIs and seed companies will improve the likelihood that the results
of public breeding programs will reach farmers.
Commercial seed development
Although current regulations and seed distribution programs limit the development
of commercial seed sectors, it would be misleading to give the impression that Africa
is full of potential entrepreneurs waiting for the green light of seed policy reform.
The seed business is full of risks, and there are many uncertainties about the potential
level of seed demand in Africa.
There are a few obvious success stories for commercial seed in Africa. The most
prominent example is the sale of hybrid maize. In Zimbabwe and Kenya, 68% and
52%, respectively, of the area planted to maize is sown to hybrid seed (CIMMYT,
1999). South Africa has a strong and competitive seed sector built around the supply
of hybrid seed for maize, sorghum and sunflower.
Yet a stable and commercially viable hybrid seed sector remains a characteristic
of only a handful of countries. Several multinational seed companies have entered
national markets only to retreat after a few years of disappointing sales. In many of
these cases, farmers have simply not been willing to pay the high seed prices (7 to
10 times the grain price) characteristic of hybrids. Despite the privatization of the
national seed company in Malawi, and the development of several attractive new
maize hybrids, only a minority of farmers are regular purchasers of hybrid seed in
this country (Smale and Phiri, 1998).
Nonetheless, recent research evidence suggests that commercial seed demand has
been underestimated. First, it is important to correct the myth that virtually all of
the seed used in Africa, of crops other than hybrid maize, is farm-saved. The degree
to which farmers save their own seed varies widely, depending on the crop and the
farming conditions. As a rough estimate, at least 20 to 30 percent of the non-commer-
cial seed used by African farmers is acquired off-farm (Tripp, 2000). The most fre-
quent reason for obtaining fresh seed is to make up for a poor harvest. Seed stocks
may be consumed before planting time, or sold by families desperate for cash. Yet
the decision to dispose of these stocks is made with knowledge that seed is likely
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to be available from neighbors or nearby traders at the beginning of the next plant-
ing season.
Studies of seed market activity in southern and western Africa show that the
majority of small-scale farmers participate in acquiring or providing seed in any
given year (Rohrbach, 1997; Ndjeunga, 1999). Many of these transactions take the
form of gifts or barter. However, a significant proportion of seed is also annually
purchased for cash, from other farmers or grain markets. Such purchases are common
among virtually all types of farmers. Although this ‘seed’ is usually purchased for
the prevailing grain price, companies need to recognize that such prices rise consider-
ably at planting time. Farmers are often paying close to what a well-run commercial
enterprise could charge for non-hybrid seed (i.e., 2 or 3 times harvest grain price).
An experimental program in Zimbabwe aimed to challenge the perception of both
seed companies and rural retail traders that once farmers obtain seed of a given
open- or self-pollinated variety, they will not return to the market to purchase fresh
seed (Rohrbach and Malusalila, 1999). The Seed Company of Zimbabwe worked
with ICRISAT to test the demand of small-scale farmers by selling small packs of
sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut and sunflower seed through rural retailers. The seed
was priced at full commercial levels. Despite the late delivery of the stocks, virtually
all of the seed was sold, and the Seed Company of Zimbabwe quickly agreed to
expand the scheme the following season. The Seed Company has also encouraged
a sister institution, Sementes de Mocambique (the national seed company in
Mozambique) to establish the program in three provinces of that country. Retail
stockists were similarly enthusiastic to participate in this program during the
1999/2000 planting season.
Yet the development of this market remains an uphill battle. Much of the Seed
Company of Zimbabwe’s packing capacity for small packs of seed was unexpectedly
committed until late in the planting season to meet contracts to supply seed for
Malawi’s 1999/2000 “Starter Pack Program”. As a result, efforts to evaluate the size
and consistency of commercial seed demand in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique
have had to be postponed for a year.
The limited strength of retailing capabilities for agricultural inputs, including seed,
remains an important problem. More than a decade ago, Shepherd (1989) warned
that the liberalization of fertilizer markets in Africa would not lead to a great increase
in sales unless attention was given to the financial and technical capacities of stock-
ists. That judgement is still relevant today for both fertilizer and seed marketing
networks. Most rural retailers survive on the basis of rapid turnover of limited capital
obtained through the sale of commodities for which demand is well known. These
traders are reluctant to risk their scarce capital stocking commodities such as seed,
for which demand is less certain. Thus, initial market development investments are
required to prove the level and consistency of seed demand. If seed system develop-
ment is to be sustainable, larger efforts will be required to build local marketing insti-
tutions.
Another lesson from recent seed studies in Africa is the opportunity for linking
seed provision with the development of product markets. The demand for improved
varieties of pigeonpea in Kenya and Tanzania has been linked with the growing
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demand for grain for export to India and Europe (Jones et al., 1999). In Kenya, a
seed company has recently initiated pigeonpea seed production in response to
demand from several NGOs interested in promoting the commercialisation of the
crop. A grain trader in northern Tanzania has initiated seed sales to farmers from
whom he purchases pigeonpea grain.
Unfortunately, there are relatively few examples of successful efforts to link seed
sales with the development of product markets in Africa. One problem is that grain
marketing itself has been historically controlled by the government, and premiums
for grain quality (that might lead to demand for better seed) are rarely in evidence.
Another problem is the high transaction costs (and slow development of trust
between merchants and farmers) in many cash cropping situations. These costs are
multiplied when companies or traders must work with larger numbers of dispersed
and relatively isolated small-scale farmers. A study by Dorward et al. (1998) illus-
trates how these problems affect the provision of cotton seed in Ghana and cashew
seed in Tanzania.
Local-level seed projects
In the past decade, many donors and policymakers have promoted the development
of community-level seed enterprises as an alternative source of seed for non-hybrid
varieties (Wiggins and Cromwell, 1995). There have been a large number of projects
in Africa, Asia and Latin America that have pursued this goal. The strategies have
varied, but many projects in Africa follow a similar pattern: NGO or project staff
organize farmers in a village who wish to be seed producers; in the majority of cases
the farmers are encouraged to work as a group. The farmers are loaned source seed
(usually acquired from the NARI) of one or more new crop varieties. They are
expected to multiply this seed, and to repay the loan with fresh seed to be allocated
to a new set of farmers. These nascent entrepreneurs are provided with training in
seed multiplication techniques and often some kind of quasi-certification is provided
by staff of the regulatory agency or by extension agents who are deputed as seed
inspectors. The farmers are then expected to use part of the seed on their farms, and
to sell the rest to neighboring farmers. The theory is that this activity will evolve
into a financially viable village-level enterprise.
There is now enough experience with these projects to develop some general con-
clusions about their performance. In a number of cases, they have been quite effective
at expanding farmers’ access to seed of new varieties. The seed has diffused well
beyond the participating farmers and often to other villages. But this diffusion has
taken place through the normal channels of seed exchange between households; the
seed is either provided as gifts, or is sold at the price of grain. We know of no case
where a sustainable small-scale seed enterprise has emerged from this type of
activity. The reasons are fairly obvious.
In the first place, there is simply not sufficient demand at the individual village
level to maintain a commercial seed enterprise, and farmer seed producers usually
have few contacts outside their villages. A few projects have resolved this constraint
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by collecting seed for ad hoc sale to government or NGO-supported relief and devel-
opment programs. However, this strategy is unsustainable in the long run. None of
these projects have developed retail trading networks.
The attainment of cost recovery is complicated by the inability of neighboring
farmers to acknowledge any added value of seed produced in this way. Farmers see
little reason to start paying their neighbors a premium for locally-produced seed. If
the full costs of source seed, seed inspections and advisory services are included,
the probability of maintaining a financially viable enterprise after the termination of
project support is very low.
One example of small-scale seed production that has had greater success provides
a contrast to the strategy described above. In Ghana, individual farmers (often former
contract growers for the defunct national seed company) have been recruited and
trained to multiply seed of open-pollinated maize varieties. The growers buy foun-
dation seed from a government agency, multiply it, and pay for conditioning and
storage (at the former seed company’s facilities). The growers are responsible for
selling their seed to input dealers; these dealers usually buy seed from several differ-
ent growers. The dealers may help finance the seed multiplication and storage, and
the growers in turn often agree to be paid for their seed after it has been sold (Lyon
and Afikorah-Danquah, 1998). The system is far from perfect, as it relies on access
to former parastatal processing and storage facilities, and on the administration of
quality control by an under-funded regulatory agency. But at least it is based on a
transparent system of access to source seed and processing facilities and uses the
commercial experience and financing of established input dealers.
Seed policy reform
Policy reform must start with a re-examination of the objectives of seed system
development, and a diagnosis of problems still limiting the delivery of high quality
seed to most farmers. Seed systems emerge in response to investment incentives and
consumer demand. In many countries the underlying conditions for investment and
the articulation of demand need to be strengthened.
Policies need to envision complementary roles for the public and private sectors,
recognizing that these will evolve with time. In the short term, a larger share of
public research budgets needs to be allocated to the technology transfer activities
necessary to justify past investments in variety development. A well functioning
NARI should be capable of promoting the adoption of useful crop varieties, as well
as developing them. In pursuing this objective, NARIs ought to become more proac-
tive in advertising new varieties and promoting commercial seed production and sale.
A more aggressive NARI role presumes a concerted donor effort in supporting public
agricultural research as well as the development of national political will to put
NARIs on a firm footing. Unfortunately, neither prospect is currently very bright.
Seed sector development policies should also aim to reduce chauvinism in variety
testing and release. National varieties (like national airlines) are a source of pride,
but are often an inefficient luxury. For many crops, in many countries, there is simply
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not sufficient demand to justify independent breeding programs. Seed policies should
explicitly encourage regional releases and regional variety registration. Emphasis can
then be placed on encouraging seed companies to pursue regional markets, and pro-
viding farmers larger sets of variety choices.
Correspondingly, policies targeting the development of the private seed sector
should also promote a regional approach. In the short term private investment will
be motivated more by the prospect of regional markets than by small national mar-
kets. The success of harmonized seed laws ought, then, to be measured in the growth
of regional seed trade.
Special incentives are required to encourage investment in the development of
seed marketing channels extending deeper into rural areas. For those crops for which
there is a clear commercial demand for particular varieties, more support can be
given to helping link output markets and input supply. Credit and business training
may be earmarked for small-scale rural retailers willing to stock a wider range of
agricultural inputs. Publicly funded extension support can more directly promote
experimentation with new agricultural inputs. Over time, as farmers become accus-
tomed to buying seed, or at least looking for new varieties, public interventions can
be reduced.
Donors and NGOs, as well as policymakers, should think more carefully about
what types of community level activities are most likely to stimulate seed system
development. There is now good evidence that, despite its attractive image, the strat-
egy of village-level seed enterprises is untenable. Part of the problem is mistaking
seed multiplication (which all farmers are capable of) for the more complex process
of market development. Community seed projects may achieve a greater impact by
strengthening the capacities of farmers to test new varieties and to make them well-
informed consumers of agricultural inputs. Local-level interventions should also
develop farmers’ crop marketing capacities.
Policymakers also face some difficult choices regarding the future of current seed
regulatory regimes. Regulatory systems and institutions feature mixtures of good
intentions and entrenched interests. Regulation ought to become more of a shared
responsibility of seed producers, seed consumers, and a third party agency (Tripp
and Louwaars, 1997). In most African countries, the current balance over-emphasizes
the government regulator. There is little evidence that mandatory certification and
testing has substantially benefited most farmers. Such regulations have probably con-
strained the distribution of new varieties. A more iterative and experimental approach
to seed regulation seems to be needed. Seed regulatory agencies may provide a more
positive contribution to market development by shifting their emphasis to consumer
education and to point-of-sale inspection in order to strengthen the farmers’ side of
the regulatory equation.
Finally, more coherent national seed policies with specific impact objectives are
required. In the past, it has been too easy for policymakers and donors to address
seed development with a series of disconnected, often inconsistent, projects. These
offer an attractive way for donors to spend their budgets. They often contribute an
appealing community-level focus, but they rarely pay any attention to the long-term
strategies of sectoral development. Recent experiences suggest there is no simple
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formula for seed system development. But they also reveal the importance of on-
going monitoring of the impacts of new investments, an evolution in the roles of
the public and private sectors, and an agreement about both short and medium terms
goals for seed system development.
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